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SOM-theme B - Innovation and interaction
ABSTRACT
The strategic management paradigm explains organizational performance through the
alignment between environment, strategy, and reference points. We extend this paradigm by
incorporating the role of interorganizational networks on firm performance, thus integrating
strategic management and corporate social capital theory. This results in four normative
propositions that describe the conditions under which particular interfirm network structures
assist or impede firm performance.
(also downloadable) in electronic version: http://som.rug.nl
                                                     
# We thank John Naman, Toby Stuart, Ilan Talmud, and Ezra Zuckerman for their valuable
comments on earlier versions of this paper.
2Corporate Social Capital and the Strategic Management Paradigm: A
Contingency View on Organizational Performance
What makes an organization more successful than another? Scholars of the firm have
long concerned themselves with the search for the differential characteristics that
affect performance of organizations. Recently, within this context the research of
social networks has gained considerable prominence. Inter-organizational networks
have been shown to affect, among other things, the learning potential of companies,
the potential for resource procurement, and firms’ ability to harness themselves
against competition and changing customer demands. Despite the growing interest in
the study of social networks and organizations it has been pointed out that the
literature still lacks an overarching paradigm that systematically associates the two
(Granovetter, 1985; Salancik, 1995). In response, social capital theory has been
embraced by organizational scholars as a potential theoretical basis for the study of
networks in organizations (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Pennings, Lee & Van
Witteloostuyn, 1998; Gabbay & Leenders, 1999). However, notwithstanding the
tremendous increase in social capital references in the organization literature, a
common definition of social capital and a coherent theory (and encompassing set of
measures and indicators) for the systematic explanation of the effects of networks on
the performance of organizations is still missing.
Recently, Gabbay & Leenders (1999) suggested to define social capital as the
productive set of resources, tangible or virtual, that accrue to an actor through the
actor’s social relationships and facilitate the attainment of goals. In effect, Gabbay
and Leenders suggest to frame social capital in terms of the competitive or value-
generating outcomes of social networks, rather than as the structural appearance of
the network itself. If these outcomes are beneficial to the attainment of goals, the
network is said to generate social capital. Since Gabbay and Leenders focus on the
effects of networks on organizations and their members, they employ the term
‘corporate social capital.’ In the present paper, we adhere to this definition.
3Two recent developments in the social capital literature are of consequence to our
current paper. First, although traditionally the focus of social capital theory has been
on the effect networks bring to individuals (e.g., Burt, 1992, 1997; Podolny & Baron
1997; Higgins & Nohria 1999) in recent publications scholars have pointed to the
social capital effects of inter- and intra-organizational networks on organizations.1
For instance, Nahapiet & Ghoshal (1998) and Tsai & Ghoshal (1998) provide a
detailed discussion of the interrelationship between social structure and the creation
and maintenance of intellectual capital by firms. Leana & Van Buren III (1999)
derive a formal network model of how organizational employment practices foster or
discourage, eventually, successful collective action. Pennings et al. (1998) show that
social networks diminish dissolutions of professional service firms. In sum, social
capital theory has started to gain its position among prominent theories of
organization.
Second, although most social capital studies are partial to explaining favorable
effects of networks, it has recently been proposed that it is useful to make a
distinction between the positive and negative outcomes of networks (Gabbay &
Zuckerman, 1998; Leenders & Gabbay, 1999a; Adler & Kown, 2000; Hansen et al,
2001). In this view, social networks provide social capital only in their productive
and positive effect on the goal attainment of actors—when networks inhibit an actor's
performance, they provide social liability rather than social capital. A network may
thus provide social capital to one organization and social liability to another.
Similarly, social networks may provide social capital for the attainment of one goal,
but social liability for the attainment of another. For example, a cohesive network can
provide a firm with timely access to external knowledge resources, but may also
decrease the firm’s ability to anticipate changes in the market by shielding off the
firm from valuable outside information (Podolny, 1994). Moreover, social networks
may yield social capital at one point in time, but social liability at another. As an
example, Gargiulo & Benassi (1999) show that the network that in the past had
provided managers with ample social capital later increased the number of
4coordination failures for which these managers were responsible. The network had
become a constraint, impeding their performance.
The theory of corporate social capital focuses on the attainment of goals by
organizational actors. In the present paper, we are specifically interested in how and
when an organization’s network leads towards above-normal corporate
performance—a question that converges with the basic purpose and philosophy of
the strategic management paradigm (e.g., Barney & Zajac, 1994; Rumelt, Schendel &
Teece, 1991). Research in this tradition has emphasized the importance of matching
industry and environmental conditions with firm strategy in order to achieve
sustainable and above-normal performance.
In the ‘traditional’ strategic management paradigm firms were seen as
autonomous entities confronted by faceless environments (Astley, 1984). This
atomistic view is the basis of the seminal works of Andrews (1971) and Porter (1980)
in which competitive interdependence is treated as a given and, once known,
prescribes (and predicts) a firm's behavior. This then leads to a predominantly
internal focus concerned with matching organizational capacities to environmental
demands. However, as Gulati et al. (2000: 203) observe, this image ‘is increasingly
inadequate in a world in which firms are embedded in networks of social,
professional, and exchange relationships with other organizational actors … the
conduct and performance of firms can be more fully understood by examining the
network of relationships in which they are embedded. By adopting a relational, rather
than an atomistic, approach, we can deepen our understanding of the sources of
differences in firm conduct and profitability.’ In concert with their suggestion, the
purpose of the current paper is to integrate, from an interorganizational network point
of view, the accumulated knowledge in the social capital and strategic management
frameworks in order to develop a paradigm that explains the creation and
management of organizational long-term abnormal performance.
In particular, our aim is to explore conditions under which interfirm networks
enhance or impede competitive advantage. Ours is not the first effort in this direction.
Recently, several scholars have begun to apply concepts and theories from the social
5network literature to the study of firm strategy. Some of the prominent examples
include Powell's work on organizational learning and innovation (1990; Powell,
Koput, and Smith-Doerr 1996), and Gulati's (1995a, 1995b) and Kogut's (1988,1989)
research on joint ventures and alliances. Baum and Dutton (1996) have discussed the
social embeddedness of firm strategies. Other2 important work in this area includes
the work of Pfeffer (1987), Podolny (1993, 1994; Podolny and Stuart, 1995; Podolny
& Castellucci, 1999), Stuart (1998, 1999, 2000; Stuart et al. 1999; Stuart and
Podolny 1996), and Uzzi (1996, 1997; Uzzi and Gillespie, 1999). Some of this work
has taken the perspective of the industry, or that of the network as a whole; other
work uses the relationship as the unit of analysis. In this paper, we explore the
conditions under which two generic types of network structures—mechanistic and
organic—promote or obstruct successful outcomes of strategic management activity.
We add to the literature by developing a normative model relating the inter-
organizational network around a focal organization (the firm’s egonetwork), firm
strategy, environment, and strategic reference points to business performance. For
ease of presentation, we will use the term competitive system to denote the
configuration of the firm’s environment, strategy, and strategic reference points. We
argue that the alignment of a firm’s competitive system with the firm’s egonetwork
affects competitive conditions and allows for (or obstructs) successful performance.
Although we will borrow heavily from the literature in sociology, organization
theory, and strategy, by no means is our goal to provide a review of the literature in
any of these fields. Rather our purpose is to present a framework for studying
networks and strategy that will bring together issues in competitive strategy and
network analysis. In the end our goal is to contribute both to the network literature
and to the literature on strategic management.
6SOCIAL NETWORKS AND THE STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT
PARADIGM
Strategic Management (RESP)
Central in the field of strategic management is the explanation of firm
performance (P)—it is commonly believed that strategy (S) and organizational
aspects are associated with performance. This has led researchers to focus on
different strategic and organizational issues such as levels of strategy, strategic
typologies, and strategic capabilities. Moreover, researchers have focused on the
environmental (E) aspects of the organization’s competitive context.
A firm’s strategy (S) and environment (E) play a major role in the analysis of firm
performance (P). However, researchers are divided in terms of the key components
and theoretical explanations that link E, S, and P. The divide is largely between the
competition-based view (CBV) and the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm. The
CBV is strongly influenced by concepts developed in economics with position and
market power of the firm in its competitive environment (E) being the major forces
driving, ultimately, firm performance (P). Within this view profitability is the
overriding goal—it is delivered by competing in the product market place. This is
evident particularly in the seminal work of Porter (1980; 1985) which strongly
expanded the popularity of this branch of theory (Rumelt et al. 1991).
In RBV, the focus moved from the demand side (the nature of the industry) to the
supply side (inside the firm). Firm strategy was believed to be based primarily on the
accumulation of organizational resources and capabilities. RBV does not deny the
importance of competition, but puts its emphasis on the internal resources of the firm.
More specifically, resource-based studies emphasize such intangible resources as
tacit knowledge, learning, strategic intent, and intelligence. Resource-based theories
focus on the resources of the organization as the source of successful competitive
strategy (S). The source of competitive advantage lies in the organization's resources,
rather than in competition in the competitive environment (E)—the focus has shifted
from value appropriation to value creation.
7FIGURE 1
RESP Framework
The ESP-strategic management paradigm is summarized on the right hand side of
Figure 1 (see Caves et al., 1980; Fiegenbaum, 1997).
Research on the risk/return association of performance has identified new and
important aspects that pertain to the ESP framework (e.g., Singh, 1986; Baird &
Thomas, 1986; Jemison, 1987). Much of this research has been inspired by the
research of Bowman (1980) who found negative relationships between risk and
return. Bowman’s findings run counter to the classic belief that risk and return have a
positive association since managers, and hence organizations, are assumed to be risk
averse. Subsequent studies (e.g., Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1988; Bromiley, 1991)
showed a negative association between risk and return for firms below their target
(troubled firms) and a positive association for firms above their target. In other
words, organizations below their targets become risk seekers, while those above their








8the study of strategic reference points (R). Fiegenbaum, Hart, & Schendel (1996)
extended the ESP-framework to include the role of reference points—we denote this
framework by RESP (see Figure 1). While strategic reference points affect the kind
of strategy a firm selects, Fiegenbaum et al. (1996) argue that strategic reference
points are, in turn, also affected by the nature of the firm’s environment (E), strategy
(S), and performance (P). Reference point theory has also been studied in marketing
(e.g., Shoham & Fiegenbaum, 1999), human resource management (e.g., Bamberger
and Fiegenbaum, 1996), and competitive strategy (Labianca et. al 2001).
In sum, we argue that the RESP framework of strategic management represents
the many and diverse perspectives in the field. It is broad enough to describe the
basic components and the possible relationships that exist among them. However,
each school of thought has its own perspective in terms of the relationships between
the four elements (RESP) to be explored.
Social Networks and the Strategic Management Paradigm (RENS-P)
Related to the RESP paradigm is a recent stream of strategic management theory
sometimes called the ‘socio-cultural’ approach. The essence of socio-cultural theory
is that companies (and their managers) are embedded in social and cultural systems
that influence their decision-making and thus the strategies they develop
(Whittington, 1993). Networks directly and indirectly influence the strategies of all
members in the competitive arena (e.g., Whitley 1991).
The mere presence of firms, suppliers, and customers in the firm’s environment
creates a competitive potential, but it does not necessarily ensure this potential is
fulfilled. The social ties maintained by a firm are at the heart of the process that
creates sustainable competitive advantage. Many of the competitive advantages in
industries depend on the flow of information, the discovery of value-adding
exchanges or transactions, the willingness to align agendas and work across
organizations, and strong motivation for improvement. Underpinning these are
networks (Porter, 1998). As Moran & Ghoshal (1999: 409) argue, it is not resources
per se, but the ability to access, deploy, exchange, and combine them that lies at the
9heart of competitive advantage of firms—in other words: networks (cf. Talmud,
1999).
Despite the passionate calls made by Granovetter (1985) to economic sociologists
and by Pfeffer (1987) and Powell (1996) to scholars of strategy, strategy research is
still characterized primarily—although not exclusively—by an atomistic approach
(Baum & Dutton, 1996). The competition-based and resource-based views of the firm
tend to conceptualize markets as comprising of independent actors, each acting
autonomously. In RBV, for example, the search for resources and capabilities has
typically been restricted to the organization itself and has ignored the organization's
ties to other entities in its environment. The empirical reality, however, is that firms
are increasingly embedded in vast and overlapping networks of ties with customers,
suppliers, competitors, universities, governments, and other institutions
(Galaskiewicz and Zaheer, 1999). A recent suggestion has been that the search for
these resources extends beyond the boundaries of the firm (Gulati, 1999; McEvily &
Zaheer, 1999; Stuart & Podolny 1996; Ahuja, 2000). The network can be thought of
as an inimitable resource itself, and as means to access inimitable resources and
capabilities (cf. Freeman & Barley 1990; Galaskiewicz and Zaheer, 1999; Gulati et
al. 2000: 207; Stuart & Podolny 1996: 36; Zaheer & Zaheer 1997). Gulati (1999)
refers to these as ‘network resources’ in a fashion similar to the concept of corporate
social capital. Just as traffic can not be fully understood without studying the road-
system, organizations (and their performance) can not be fully understood without
studying the pattern of relationships among the actors in an industry.
Social networks act as a hinge within the RESP-framework—they affect, and are
affected by, all elements of the framework. Interfirm affect how firms evaluate their
performance. Similarly, they affect, and are affected by, the strategies organizations
employ. Finally, they partly shape, and are shaped by, firm performance. In essence,
networks play an important role in the congruence between the elements of the




Central in the RENS-P framework is the concept of fit. The key assumption is that
for an organization to perform effectively, fit between environmental and strategic
characteristics has to be established (e.g., Venkatraman, 1989; Venkatraman &
Camillus, 1984; Miles & Snow, 1994). The concept of fit is central to the field of
strategic management, which has experienced over the years an increasing interest in
the issue of fit between a firm and its environment, strategy, structure, and
processes.3 Our notion of fit is closely related to that of the structural contingency
theory known from the Organization Behavior literature, the best-phrased summary
of which is probably given by Galbraith (1973) in the two maxims that ‘there is no
one best way to organize’ and that ‘all ways of organizing are not equally effective.’
In this paper we study the structure of relationships maintained by a focal firm:
the firm's egonetwork. These networks bring knowledge, information, control,
physical resources, and financial resources. Not all firms possess comparable levels
of network resources and firms differ in the types and levels of resources they
require. Specifically, firms' networks vary in terms of structure, or the pattern of ties,
and nodal diversity, or the variation in the mix of contacts in firms' networks
(McEvily and Zaheer, 1999: 1136; Galaskiewicz and Zaheer, 1999). Similarly, Miller
(1996) suggests that a firm's strategy (and success thereof) is a function of the
strength, diversity, and longevity of a firm's interactions.4 In like manner, in their
study of how networks affect the cost of capital firms pay on their loans, Uzzi and
Gillespie (1999) argue that one needs to consider at once the longevity of the
relationships maintained by the focal firm, their multiplexity, network size, and
extent of network coupling. These researches all have in common that the authors
stress simultaneous consideration of a set of network attributes, rather than a focus on
one single characteristic such as size or strength. In the remainder of this paper, we
will argue that at least four characteristics appear to move in tandem in the RENS-P
framework: tie volume, diversity, strength, and longevity. These characteristics
correspond with those considered by Zaheer, Miller, and Uzzi to a considerable
extent and together compare closely to the classic categorization of Burns & Stalker
11
TABLE 1





Tie volume low high
Tie diversity low high
Tie strength high low
Tie longevity high low
(1961). In their study of industrial firms, Burns & Stalker noticed two systems of
management practice. The first consists of firms with a management structure
characterized by rules, stability, and a high degree of formal standardization—Burns
& Stalker called these 'mechanistic.' The second pertains to organization that is much
looser and adaptive, largely informal, and governed by mutual adjustment and
standardization of norms—they called these structures 'organic.' In concert with
Burns and Stalker, we define organic egonetworks as consisting of a high volume of
ties, many of which (potentially) short-lived, relatively weak, and diverse in content.
In a mechanistic egonetwork, on the other hand, the focal organization maintains a
relatively low volume of ties, most of which are strong and stable. Table 1 provides a
summary.
In the remainder of this paper, we will derive propositions on the interplay of
social networks and the elements of the RENS-P paradigm. In so doing, we will
develop a contingency theory that integrates the strategic management paradigm and
social capital theory. From these propositions we will then derive conditions under
which networks provide firms with social capital or social liability. Figure 2 shows
the extended RENS-P framework with the four propositions. Although the tone of the
discussion that follows below may seem deterministic, mutual causality and dynamic
and iterative processes of adjustment between the various elements of the framework


























































































For clarity of exposition, we will consider each group of propositions
independently of the other groups. However, we do recognize that various effects in
one group are interrelated with the other groups. In the discussion section we will
discuss some intricacies that follow from the interrelationships within this
framework.
THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND PROPOSITIONS
Social Network - Environment
An organization's environment consists of a complex interplay of an array of
elements. A firm's environment poses an element of uncertainty to organizations
(Duncan, 1972), which has been characterized along a number of dimensions—the
most common being unpredictability and complexity (Mintzberg, 1979).
Stable, non-changing, markets are increasingly uncommon. Change in itself is not
problematic—it is the extent to which events are unpredictable which determines the
difficulty firms experience in responding to environmental change. This increases the
risk of failure for organizational responses and makes it difficult to compute costs
and probabilities associated with decision alternatives. In the literature, this
characteristic is often called 'dynamics.' However, since this term confounds change
per se with unpredictable change, we prefer to use the term unpredictability.
A second characteristic, the complexity of a firm's environment is determined by
the number of different actors the firm requires knowledge and information about, in
order to timely respond to environmental events. Complexity increases with the
number and dissimilarity of external elements relevant to the firm’s operations.
Contingency propositions. Higher levels of unpredictability create a need for
increased levels of information on the firm’s environment. In a predictable
environment, an organization can more easily insulate its operating core and
standardize its activities or skills. Standardized, routine scanning of the environment
is sufficient. Alternatively, faced with uncertain sources of supply, demand, and
market conditions, the organization cannot rely on the standardization of its
15
information and knowledge acquiring process (Mintzberg, 1979). Relationships with
an increasing number of (heterogeneous) environmental parties are required for
timely access to information and for the insurance of access to (potentially) required
resources. When firms are confronted with high levels of unpredictability, they need
to create and maintain structures that can quickly extract and filter required
information from the environment and channel it to the focal firm. Firms need to
remain responsive and flexible so that they can adapt quickly, while at the same time
developing new initiatives. Firms in unpredictable environments thus require5
organic egonetworks since these have a higher information collecting and processing
capacity (Galbraith, 1973) than do mechanistic structures, are more fluid, and allow
the firm to adapt quickly and continually to changes in its environment. In a highly
unpredictable environment the egonetwork should be large and heterogeneous.
Relationships may be short-lived as changes in the environment may render them
unproductive. In such environments, organic egonetworks are much more effective
than mechanistic egonetworks.
The traditional approach to dealing with environmental uncertainty is to establish
buffer departments within the firm. For example, a purchasing department can buffer
the technical core by stockpiling raw material and supplies. A newer approach is to
drop most of the internal buffers and instead be more connected to customers and
suppliers. Rather than creating buffer departments within the firm, potential buffers
are effectively maintained by means of the firm’s egonetwork. Predictability of the
environment is thus increased.
Although capturing different processes, environmental complexity leads to
structures similar to that in case of environmental unpredictability—they often move
in tandem. Complexity drives forces of mutual adjustment. Moreover, environmental
complexity creates a greater need for information on more different parties. For this
purpose, firms require a larger volume of ties than do organizations in simple
environments. Organic networks are preferable because of their high information
gathering and processing capacity.
Another reason for firms to engage in many (weak) ties in a complex environment
is that it places the firm in a more central position in the industry’s network. The
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firm’s central position conveys information to the environment that presents the
organization in a favorable light (Stuart, 1999) and increases the firm’s status. Proven
firm trustworthiness and reliability in interactions travels fast through a highly
interconnected network. This is critical in complex environments (cf. Podolny 1994)
and, in turn, enhances the organic character of the focal firm’s egonetwork.
Proposition 1a: (Network-Environment). The more mechanistic (rather
than organic) a firms’ egonetwork, the more a predictable and simple
(rather than unpredictable and complex) competitive environment will
be established.
Proposition 1b: (Environment-Network). The more unpredictable or
complex a firm’s competitive environment, the more an organic (rather
than mechanistic) egonetwork is required.
Social Network - Strategy
Various business strategies have been identified in the literature. For the purpose
of this paper we consider Porter’s (1980) two6 generic strategies: cost leadership and
differentiation. A cost leadership strategy suggests an internal orientation whereby a
firm focuses on operating practices, equipment, and labor costs that deliver the
lowest costs in that industry. A low-cost producer must find and exploit all potential
sources of cost advantage, often including the production of standard products and
operating economies of scale. A cost leadership strategy requires aggressive
construction of efficient scale facilities, vigorous pursuit of cost reductions from
experience curve effects, tight cost and overhead control, avoidance of marginal
customer accounts, and cost minimization in the functional areas. In effect, cost
leaders shave costs off every element in the value chain. After successfully
implementing this strategy, the costs of the cost leader are lower than those of other
competitors, delivering above-average profits. The cost leadership strategy is closely
related to what Miles & Snow (1978, 1994) and Nicholson et al. (1990) term the
'defender' strategy.
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A differentiation strategy allows the products of a firm to meet the needs of some
customers in the market place better than others. The company adds perceived value
to a product and is then able to charge a price that is higher than the average. The
concept which underlines this strategy is market segmentation. Differentiation entails
achieving industry-wide recognition of different and superior products and services
compared to competitors. By creating customer loyalty and price inelasticity, this
strategy erects competitive barriers to entry, provides higher margins, and reduces the
power of buyers who feel they lack substitute products (Porter, 1980). Producers
following this strategy incur higher costs than competitors do—the relative advantage
is derived from the product's above average pricing. The differentiation strategy is
closely related to what Miles & Snow (1978, 1994) and Nicholson et al. (1990) term
the 'prospector' strategy and requires a proactive external orientation.
Contingency propositions. Given the strategy's emphasis on efficiency and cost
control, firms pursuing the strategy of cost leadership can not afford to maintain a
large network. The transaction costs associated with the maintenance of a high
volume of ties renders cost leadership unfeasible. In addition, firms pursuing a cost
leadership strategy prefer a low number of large volume suppliers to a larger number
of small volume suppliers. By purchasing at high volumes, suppliers can be forced
into giving strong price cuts. Moreover, the costs associated with controlling and
handling many small sized suppliers are high, compared to the costs associated with
larger suppliers.
Cost leadership requires that product lines remain rather stable and that
innovations deal mainly with the production processes in the internal organization—
focus is on process innovation, rather than on product innovation. Non-varying
products and procedures reduce the need to maintain a large, stable, volume of ties.
In sum, the successful pursuit of a cost leadership strategy requires firms to create
and maintain a mechanistic egonetwork. For a differentiation strategy an organic
egonetwork is more fitting—new product development and adaptation to (external)
demands on quality require a firm to be more flexible. A differentiation strategy is
based on the firm’s ambition to distinguish itself from the competition. For that, the
firm needs to be proactive in the development of product, process, technical and
18
market knowledge, and technology. When following a differentiation strategy, firms
require a wider variety of scarce resources than do organizations pursuing the
strategy of cost leadership. The firm’s egonetwork provides the resources essential to
the timely and successful achievement of these goals.
Proposition 2a: (Network-Strategy). The more organic (rather than
mechanistic) a firm’s egonetwork, the more a differentiation strategy
(rather than a cost leadership strategy) is required.
 Proposition 2b: (Strategy-Network). When a firm pursues a
differentiation strategy (rather than a cost leadership strategy) an
organic (rather than mechanistic) egonetwork is required.
Social Network – Strategic Reference Points
Strategic reference point (SRP) theory postulates that a firm’s choice of strategic
reference points can help achieve strategic alignment capable of leading to improved
performance (Fiegenbaum, Hart, & Schendel, 1996). Two dimensions that spread the
strategic space that managers must recognize and operate within are the internal and
external dimensions (Fiegenbaum et al., 1996). The internal dimension includes
strategic input (e.g., cost reduction, quality improvement, and new product
development) and output (e.g., sales, profitability, and growth). The external
reference dimension includes competitors, customers, and other stakeholders (such as
suppliers, shareholders, and government agencies). SRP’s represent the
organization’s subjective perception of its competitive position, which affects
strategic decisions taken by the organization.
Contingency propositions. When a firm employs an internal reference point, it
benchmarks its performance against its own internal targets. Firms with an internal
reference first aim to achieve such goals as manufacturing excellence, the creation of
technical knowledge, the development of process technology, and product
development speed.
Firms with an external reference first aim at customer and shareholder
satisfaction, and benchmark against the achievements of their competitors.
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Successful employment of internal reference points requires stable relationships with
buyers, suppliers, and strategic partners. A firm can not allow itself to focus on the
development of expert capabilities and new technology without trusting that its
partners will be interested in it in the foreseeable future. Moreover, internal
development often requires external parties to collaborate with—these parties should
be willing to invest in a long-term relationship and be trustworthy as to prevent
spillover. External reference points, on the other hand, require a firm to extract much
information about customers and competitors from the market place. Mechanistic
networks are an ineffective means for this goal. The high information gathering and
processing capacity of organic networks, on the other hand, makes them greatly
suited for this endeavor.
Internal reference points and mechanistic egonetworks combine well, because
internal reference points require the levels of stability and trust that mechanistic
networks provide. Conversely, external reference points and mechanistic
egonetworks do not combine, because the information purchasing power of
mechanistic networks is too low for the firm to successfully strategize on external
benchmarks. In organic networks relatively higher investments in monitoring external
constituencies are necessary, therefore internal reference points are less feasible.
Proposition 3a: (Network-SRP). When a firm pursues an organic (rather
than mechanistic) egonetwork an emphasis on internal (rather than
external) strategic reference points is required.
Proposition 3b: (SRP-Networks). When a firm emphasizes external
(rather than internal) strategic reference points an organic (rather than
mechanistic) egonetwork is required.
Competitive System - Performance
Competitive strategy is about the management of firm performance. The
complementarities or congruencies of Reference points, Environment, Network
structure, and Strategy structure are expected to be associated with high performance.
The mere presence of a certain strategy or egonetwork structure will not likely
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produce success in its own right. Neither strategies nor structures by themselves will
be adequate to ensure good performance. For example, cost leadership requires a
more mechanistic egonetwork; an unpredictable environment compels organizations
to maintain more organic network structures. Cost leadership in an unpredictable
environment thus is not sustained by the same network characteristics. A match
between network structure and strategy will be inadequate if either conflicts with the
firm’s competitive environment. Proposition 4a suggests that firms perform better to
the extent that all elements of the framework (Reference Points, Environment,
Strategy, and Network structure) are mutually congruent.7
Proposition 4a. (Competitive framework – Performance) The better the
fit between the firm’s egonetwork and the firm’s competitive system, the
higher the firm’s performance.8
Proposition 4a also accentuates Porter’s statement that firms can not successfully
simultaneously pursue both a cost leadership strategy and a differentiation strategy.
Since the former requires a mechanistic egonetwork and the latter calls for an organic
egonetwork structure, firms in pursuit of both strategies truly get ‘stuck in the
middle’ and find themselves with network configurations unfitting with either
strategy. From Proposition 4a, it follows that sustained high performance in this
situation is unlikely.
Table 2 collapses propositions 1 through 3, and shows how the elements of the
RENS-P framework fit together.
TABLE 2.






Strategy cost leadership differentiation
Reference points internal external
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In this paper we have suggested that a firm’s egonetwork is affected by various
pressures (such as the environment the firm operates in or the strategy it follows), but
also that firms have a degree of control over the structure of their egonetworks, the
(choice of) environment they are active in, and the strategy they pursue. Low
performers are incited to adapt these elements into a more congruent whole. When a
firm’s environment and egonetwork match, but are incongruent with the firm’s
strategy, a firm can increase its performance by adapting its strategy. By actively
crafting a firm’s egonetwork, strategy, reference points, and environment a firm can
create fit among the elements or maintain its fit. When conditions change, such as
when competition changes, new technology is introduced, customer demands change,
or new products are introduced to the market, an active process of incremental
change along the elements of the RENS-P framework can maintain or increase their
fit. As Miles & Snow (1994) argue, fit is a not a state, but a process.
Proposition 4b: (Performance – Competitive system). When a firm is
dissatisfied with its current performance, it will look to change its
present configuration of the elements of RENS-P.
CORPORATE SOCIAL CAPITAL AND LIABILITY
Unpredictable or complex environments yield/require organic egonetworks. An
organic structure is also expected/required when a differentiation strategy is pursued.
A hostile environment or the pursuit of a strategy of cost leadership will force firms
to maintain a more mechanistic structure.
Propositions 4a and 4b suggest that a particular network structure can be
beneficial to organizational performance in one situation, but hinder performance in
another. Organic structures enhance a firm’s performance in environments
characterized by high uncertainty, but may be much less beneficial (or even
obstructive) to firms in a highly stable and simple environment. Since we argue that
organizational performance is conditional on the alignment of the firm’s competitive
system and its egonetwork, these propositions suggest under what conditions
egonetworks provide the organization with social capital or social liability.
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In the introduction section we formulated that social capital and social structure
are related but different entities. From the four propositions it indeed follows that the
same social structure may be beneficial in one situation, but impeding in another—
cost leaders benefit from a mechanistic egonetwork, but differentiators are obstructed
by such a structure. Equating social structure with social capital suggests that more is
better. When a differentiation strategy is followed, firms may indeed draw
advantages from an increased volume of inter-organizational linkages. For cost
leaders, however, increasing the volume of their interfirm relationships also increases
operational costs, which may threaten the firm’s cost effectiveness. Our discussion
thus suggests that social capital is not fruitfully and generalizably measured by the
volume of ties maintained by a firm—in some situations an increased number of ties
yields increased social capital, in other situations does it yield increased social
liability.
In addition, we suggest that it is not the volume of ties per se, which provides
differentiators with above-normal performance—it is also the strength and longevity
of the ties and diversity of parties with whom relationships are maintained. In other
words, the structural configuration of a firm’s egonetwork has a stronger effect on
organizational performance than does volume of ties separately. In order to
understand which network structure bestows firms with social capital, we have to
consider all aspects of the network rather than just one structural aspect. Moreover,
one needs to take into account the fit of the firm’s egonetwork configuration with its
competitive system (and the internal fit of the elements within this system) in order to
draw conclusions about (or predict) the effect of networks on organizational
performance.
DISCUSSION
Our primary objective in this paper has been to identify effects of interfirm
relationships on firm performance. Drawing on the (extended) strategic management
paradigm Reference points-Environment-Networks-Strategy-Performance, we
propose that the (positive or negative) effect of inter-organizational structures is
contingent upon the fit of the firm’s egonetwork. When fit among all elements in the
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system is high, a firm has met a necessary condition for high performance. When fit
lacks, the ability of a firm to obtain above-normal performance is impeded. The
normative framework we have discussed here advances the theory of firm-level social
capital by identifying the contingent nature of the effect of interfirm networks on
performance. A firm that has achieved an aligned system of strategy, environment,
and reference points, supported by a congruent egonetwork configuration can benefit
from substantial social capital. However, if the firm’s egonetwork is not congruent
with, for example, the strategy pursued by the firm, the firm’s performance will likely
be negatively affected. The firm’s egonetwork then brings social liability to the firm.
Although the propositions are voiced in absolute terms, the environmental
dimensions we distinguish in this paper are of a relative quality. No environment can
truly be characterized as, for example, being ‘complex but predictable.’ These
dimensions should be interpreted as relating to the extent to which an environment is
complex/predictable. The same holds for the conceptualization ‘mechanistic’ and
‘organic’ networks. These two types are extremes of a continuum. A network can
seldom be said to be completely ‘mechanistic,’ it can, however, be said that a
network is fairly mechanistic or that it is of a more mechanistic nature than is another
network. Moreover, the organicity of an egonetwork should be considered in terms of
the nature of the industry the focal firm belongs to. For example, by their nature,
retail businesses have a larger average number of ties than do firms in the defense
industry. Mechanistic networks in the defense industry thus involve a considerably
smaller number of ties than do mechanistic retail egonetworks.9 We only argue, for
example, that when environments become increasingly unpredictable, egonetworks of
a more organic nature are preferable.
Our framework has several implications. It suggests that the effects of structural
network attributes on organizational performance can not be fully understood without
taking into account the firm’s competitive system. Conversely, the RESP elements of
the strategic management paradigm can not be fully understood without the study of
the network context maintained by the firm. In effect, this paper calls for a
contingency approach to the study of networks and organizational performance.
Some scholars have already taken up the challenge to consider contingent effects
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under which networks provide social capital or social liability to members of the firm
(e.g., Burt, 1997; Higgins & Nohria, 1999; Adler & Kwon, 2000; Hansen et. al.,
2001).
Leenders & Gabbay (1999b) propose to guide social capital research by
discussing the contingency question: which social structure, for whom, for which
goals, where, and when? We will discuss some implications of our arguments by
briefly addressing these questions below.
Which Social Structure
In this paper we view social capital and social liability as related to the outcomes
of networks, rather than as a structural characteristic of the network. Moreover,
social capital does not follow from one single structural feature, but from a set of
features. In this paper we have confined ourselves to the volume, diversity, strength,
and longevity of relationships. A firm pursuing cost leadership with a small network
of weak short-lived ties can not expect the same social capital returns from its
egonetwork as a cost leader with a small network with homogeneous, strong, and
stable ties. In effect, it is the combination of strength, longevity, diversity, and
volume of relationships, in conjunction with the firm’s strategy, environment, and
reference points that allows for high performance or, when alignment lacks, that
impedes success.
Other network characteristics can be added to this framework, such as the
multiplexity of ties (Uzzi & Gillespie, 1999), network segmentation (cf. Porter,
1998), and the overlap of personal and firm-level (institutionalized) relationships
(Galaskiewicz & Zaheer, 1999; Knoke, 1999; Pennings & Lee, 1999).
For Whom
Within an industry network, some firms perform better than do other firms. The
search for contingencies that determine the effects of networks on firm performance
suggests that the same network structure need not bring the same effects to every
firm. Firms with similar networks may be involved in dissimilar task environments,
which may not be supported by similar structures. By the same token, firms with
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internally oriented reference points also need different network structures from those
with an external focus.
For Which Goals
Different combinations of environment, strategy, reference points, and
egonetwork may sustain alternative goals. For instance, a firm that highly regards its
social value to the community may require and favor a large and diverse network to
various parties, regardless of its business strategy. When different kinds of
performance are considered, propositions 1 through 3 may need to be altered to
accommodate for the particular goals pursued by the focal firm.
Where
Country- and region-specific environments shape the nature and intensity of
competition and influence the dynamics of local industries. Managing superior
performance requires a different organization of a firm's competitive system in
different environmental settings (Ghoshal and Nohria, 1993).
Traditional North American management style considers interdependence as a
constraint on competition. A group orientation is more favored and individualism is
less favored in Asian cultures than in America or Northern Europe (cf. Dyer, 1997;
Dyer and Singh, 1998). In Japan a firm’s conduct will depend heavily on its relations
with other firms. Numerous Japanese firms are interconnected through a keiretsu
system in which they maintain longstanding links, which may or may not be
reinforced by cross-shareholding. Each individual firm remains largely independent,
but shares a normative structure of a common purpose. Common strategies are
encouraged in this context. It is sometimes suggested that Western networks arise as
a consequence of strategic decision whereas in Asia the strategic decisions arise as a
consequence of the networks. The working of our framework will thus have a
different temporal order in these cultures. In Asia, networks are formed first, strategy,
reference points, and environment follow after that—fit is constructed on the basis of
the existing network structure. This structure tends to remain stable over time. In
North America and Europe, on the other hand, strategy may more often be
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determined in advance, and egonetworks are adapted to be aligned with the chosen
strategy.
When
Propositions 4a and b suggest that a firm’s performance is contingent upon the fit
among the elements in the entire RENS-P framework. While we argue that increased
fit should increase a firm’s performance, an important caveat is in order. Fit is a
process that requires active shaping of all four system elements (reference points,
environment, strategy, and networks). Incremental changes in any of the four
elements usually do not pose any threats to a firm’s capacity to maintain its fit.
Yet, when confronted with discontinuous change, firms may not be so quick or
capable to respond and adapt to the new situation. When a radically new technology
is introduced, for example, the change in the environment may be dramatic—the fit
between the environment and a firm’s egonetwork may falter. Since the alignment
between the other elements may still be there, it can be very difficult for a firm to
adjust to the new situation and reestablish system alignment. While the strive for
overall alignment of the elements of our framework drives and enhances firm
performance and is highly effective in times of incremental change in any of these
elements, it can, by the same token, reduce a firm’s ability to respond to
discontinuous change. The structural and cultural inertia that may follow from the
myopic goal of system alignment within the short run, can constrain a firm to its past
and present and stunt organizational change (Tushman & O’Reilly, 1997). The
network that provided the firm with social capital in the past, has then become a
source of social liability, threatening the firm’s performance. Only when a firm is
able to actively and continuously manage its network, along with its reference points,
strategy, and environment, is it able to generate both short-term and long-term above-
normal performance.
CONCLUSION
Strategic management literature sees competition as fairly static. Strategies,
ironically, often primarily result in short-term prescriptions. Yet actual competition,
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actual industries, actual markets are dynamic and rest on the search for different
strategies (Porter, 1998: 9). Thinking about competition and strategy at the company
level has been dominated by what goes on inside companies. Social capital theory
suggests that a good deal of competitive advantage (and disadvantage) resides outside
companies—in the networks they create and maintain. In this paper we have
attempted to combine the strategy and social capital literatures. The framework can
hopefully help network researchers to understand better the positive and negative
effects of interorganizational networks for the achievement of various organizational
goals. It hopefully also assists scholars of strategy to incorporate richer portraits of
organization environments and conduct, by incorporating social structure into the
paradigm. The increasing popularity of the network perspective among researchers
(e.g., Nohria & Eccles, 1992) and practitioners (e.g., Baker, 1994) underscores the
significance of networks as contexts for strategic action and performance. However,
before network thinking can more fundamentally influence organizational theory, we
need to address how networks can be 'managed' or 'reengineered' by managers as to
create social capital and facilitate the achievement of organizational goals. This
requires the development of guidelines for the strategic design of networks, much as
we now have for the design of organizations. The development of prescriptions for
organizational design was based on the study of contingencies that accompanied
specific design attributes. In a similar fashion, researchers need to consider the
contingencies under which various network structures arise and benefit
organizational performance (Madhavan, Koka, & Prescott 1998: 456; Leenders &
Gabbay 1999b).  We hope the present paper will have some value for this unfolding
type of research.
In this study, we have emphasized alignment between reference points,
environment, egonetwork, and strategy as an important condition to good firm
performance. Is this alignment sufficient for good performance? No. It is a necessary
condition, but not sufficient in its own right. Firms still need products of good quality
for which sufficient customer demand exists; they need capable employees and an
organizational culture that supports the organization’s mission. The internal
processes need to be sufficiently flexible or efficient. Without good product quality,
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competitive pricing, and market demand, no firm can sustain above-normal
performance, regardless of the fit among the elements in Figure 2. But the chances of
achieving high performance should be considerably higher when fit is increased.
Moreover, when fit is low, good and affordable products and the presence of
motivated staff will not create (sustainable) high firm performance. Congruence
between a firm’s environment, strategy, reference points, and egonetwork is a
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NOTES:
                                                     
1 A related and promising line of research is concerned with the interplay of networks of
organizations with networks of individuals (e.g., Galaskiewicz and Zaheer, 1999; Gabbay &
Leenders, 1999, 2001; Pennings & Lee, 1999).
2 This list of references is nowhere near to being comprehensive, and it is not intended to be.
Many of these papers include excellent comprehensive or focused literature reviews. For a
reader searching for deeper insight in the relations between organizational networks and firm
strategy and performance, these papers provide a useful start.
3 Important papers include Chandler, 1962; Steiner, 1979; Galbraith and Nathanson, 1979;
Gupta & Govindarajan, 1984; Venkatraman and Camillus, 1984; Hrebiniak & Joyce, 1985;
Miller, 1988; Venkatraman, 1989; Naman & Slevin, 1993; Miles and Snow, 1994; Luo and
Park 2001. These papers deal with varying models of fit. Most deal, at least, with the fit
between environment and firm strategy. Next to the variables regarded in the present paper (R,
E, S, and N), one may choose to include additional variables in a normative model. Naman and
Slevin (1993), for example, explicitly incorporate organization structure in their contingency
model. They also provide an overview of the fit pairs considered in the pertinent literature
(1993: 142). For the purpose of our paper, we have chosen to limit our focus to fit between
Reference points, Environment, Network structure, and Strategy.
4 Miller uses the terms intensity, extensiveness, and continuity, with meaning similar to tie
strength, diversity, and longevity.  For clarity of exposition in the text we have used the same
words as we use in this paper.
5 The unpredictability of a business environment has an asymmetric effect on the structural
configurations of firm networks (cf. Mintzberg, 1979). When unpredictability is high, strong
pressures on firms exist to maintain a large, diversified, volume of ties. However, the pressure
on the structural configuration of a focal firm’s egonetwork in a predictable environment, is
much smaller. For example, although it may be more efficient to limit the number of ties
maintained, the firm may still perform well with a large volume of inter-organizational ties.
Other factors such as strategy and choice of reference points will have a strong effect on the
networks of organizations in such environments—these factors are largely overridden when
unpredictability is high.
6 The third generic strategy suggested by Porter, focus, is a special case of the other two.
7 As a result, in empirical testing of the importance of fit between pairs of elements in this
framework, pairwise effects may not be statistically significant. Multivariate configurations
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may offer more useful or complete explanations than those provided by simple bivariate
descriptions (e.g., Dess, Lumpkin & Covin, 1997; Miles & Snow, 1994; Miller 1986, 1987;
Miller & Mintzberg, 1984; Mintzberg, 1979).
8 A weakened version of this proposition reads ‘The better the fit between the firm’s
egonetwork and the firm’s competitive system, the higher the chances of high firm
performance.’  We will return to this in the Discussion section.
9 We thank John Naman for suggesting this example.
